Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights) A Tribute to Kenneth L. Karst by Sunstein, Cass R.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
2000
Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal
Rights) A Tribute to Kenneth L. Karst
Cass R. Sunstein
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cass R. Sunstein, "Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights) A Tribute to Kenneth L. Karst," 47 UCLA Law Review 1333
(2000).
STANDING FOR ANIMALS (WITH NOTES
ON ANIMAL RIGHTS)
Cass R. Sunstein
INTRO DUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1333
I. ANIMAL RIGHTS IN ACTION ............................................................................... 1336
A. State Law: Cruelty, Expansively Construed ................................................ 1337
B. Federal Law: Species, Mammals, Horses, Others ......................................... 1339
C. A Federal Bill of Rights for Animals? ................................. .. .. ... .. ... .. ... .. ... ... 1340
II. STANDING: HUMAN BEINGS, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND AN IMAL W ELFARE ....................................................................................... 1342
A. Existing Law: Informational Standing ......................................................... 1343
B. Existing Law: Competitive Injuries ............................................................. 1346
C. Existing Law: Aesthetic Injuries .................................................................. 1347
D . Evaluation .................................................................................................... 1352
E. Sum m ary ...................................................................................................... 1358
III. Do ANIMALS HAVE STANDING? ......................................................................... 1359
A. A Simmering Dispute with a Simple Answer .............................................. 1359
B. The Question of Legislative Power .............................................................. 1359
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND SPECULATIONS ..................................................................... 1361
A. Standing and the Problem of Injury in Fact ................................................ 1361
B. Disaggregating Animal Rights-and the Capacity to Suffer ....................... 1362
C ONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 1366
A PPEN DIX .................................................................................................................... 1368
INTRODUCTION
In the last three decades, the protection of animals has become a perva-
sive goal of federal statutory law. However controversial the idea of "animal
rights" in theory, federal law has begun to recognize a wide range of animal
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political
Science, University of Chicago. I am grateful to Brooke May for superb research assistance, to Jill
Hasday, Richard Posner, Adrian Vermeule, and David Wolfson for valuable comments, and to
Martha Nussbaum, Laurence Tribe, and Stephen Wise for helpful discussions.
One of the distinguishing features of Kenneth Karst's work is a capacity to combine a keen sense
of justice with unusual technical abilities, and through this combination to see legal difficulties in
places where few people had seen them before. This essay is a technical one. But in Karst's spirit, I
should say at the outset that the cruel treatment of animals seems to me one of the great unaddressed
legal problems of our time. Laws now on the books could do a great deal to address the resulting
suffering. A large task for the future is to enact better laws, ones that will be taken seriously, and to
do what can be done to promote implementation of existing law. Another large task is to ensure that
the unjustified suffering of animals registers on the human view screen far more than it now does.
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rights in practice. Indeed, Congress has enacted more than fifty statutes
designed to protect the well-being of animals.
Of these, the most prominent is the Animal Welfare Act (AWA),2 which
contains a wide range of safeguards against cruelty and mistreatment, and
which creates an incipient bill of rights for animals If vigorously enforced,
the AWA, alongside other enactments at the state and federal levels, would
prevent a wide range of abusive practices. As so often, however, there is a
large gap between statutory text and real-world implementation. Many people
have criticized the national government's enforcement efforts under these
statutes, contending that the executive branch has violated the law by issu-
ing weak and inadequate regulations, making the relevant statutes symbolic
rather than real.' These complaints raise a central and largely unexplored
question, one that will inevitably increase in prominence over time: Under
what circumstances will standing be available to those, human and non-
human, who seek to challenge the unlawful mistreatment of animals6
Current doctrine is exceptionally confusing on this question One of my
chief goals here is to dispel some of the confusion in a way that, I hope, will
illuminate the law of standing and the question of animal rights as a whole.
My principal conclusion is that human beings, invoking their own injuries as
a predicate for an action, are entitled to sue to protect the interests of animals
in a variety of settings. More particularly, three categories of persons-(1)
those deprived of legally required information, (2) those facing "aesthetic"
1. For an already dated overview, see Henry Cohen, Federal Animal Protection Statutes, 1
ANIMAL L. 143 (1995). Of course, human beings are animals too, and there is an oddity, and
perhaps a pernicious one, in the linguistic convention of distinguishing between human beings
and animals. See JAMES-RACHELS, CREATED FROM ANIMALS: THE MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF
DARWINISM 172 (1990). For simplicity I use the convention at several points here.
2. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (1994).
3. See id. I use the word "incipient" because many qualifications are necessary to the view
that the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) creates a genuine animals' bill of rights. See GARY L.
FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 185-249 (1995), for an extended and highly
critical discussion of the AWA.
4. See, e.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 430-31 (D.C.
Cit. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1454 (1999); Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d
496, 498 (D.C. Cit. 1994).
5. See FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 65-90.
6. A famous article urged that standing should be accorded to nonhuman objects. See
Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L.
REV. 450, 464-73 (1972). The principal difference between that article and this one has to do with
the conception of the law of standing. In my view, the standing question is for legislative resolution.
The claim that people have standing to protect the rights of animals, and that animals may be given
standing to have suit brought on their behalf in their own name, is a claim about the nature of legis-
lative power.
7. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986);
Glickman, 154 F.3d 426.
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injury, and (3) those suffering competitively-have standing to protect the
legal interests of animals. This conclusion is part of a more general one: The
question of standing is mostly for legislative resolution, and both people and
animals have standing to protect animals to the extent that Congress has said
that they do. Under existing law, this means (in my view unfortunately) that
animals lack standing to sue in their own right, for Congress has restricted
standing to "persons." But it also means that Congress can accord standing to
animals if it chooses to do so.
As we will see, these conclusions about animal and human standing
raise a number of questions about existing standing law and suggest some
promising directions for rethinking it, not only in the context of standing to
protect animals, but more generally. In the process of discussing the stand-
ing question, I also offer a few notes on the much-debated topic of animal
rights.8 My plea here is for disaggregation. From the legal point of view, there
is nothing at all new or unfamiliar about the idea of animal rights; on the
contrary, it is entirely clear that animals have legal rights, at least of a cer-
tain kind.' Even those who seem most antagonistic to animal rights are
likely to favor animal rights of certain sorts (for example, protection against
gratuitous cruelty). Any right has a range of components: (1) a substantive
guarantee of some specified kind, often in the form of a presumptive immu-
nity or guarantee; (2) powers of enforcement, perhaps limited to public
authorities, perhaps extended to private right holders as well; (3) defenses
and excuses of rights violators; l° and (4) resources, large or small, devoted to
rights protection." Investigation of the question of standing helps show that
the real issues involve problems of enforcement and scope. Much illumina-
tion can be gained by dividing the question of animal rights into its component
parts. I will urge as well that the capacity to suffer should by itself be sufficient
to justify a level of rights protection.
8. See FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 7-11. See generally PETER SINGER, ANIMAL
LIBERATION (2d ed. 1990).
9. For this reason I question the sharp distinction drawn in FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 7,
between animal rights and animal welfare. Statutes protecting animal welfare protect a form of animal
rights, and there is nothing in the notion of rights or welfare that calls for much, or little, protection
of the relevant interests. Rights can be defeasible, and an interest in welfare may create a strong
presumption of protection. Francione convincingly shows, however, that the interests of animals
are given remarkably and indefensibly little weight under many state and federal laws.
10. Of course the defenses or excuses might be treated as part of the substantive immunity,
as, for example, in a substantive right against killing animals, a right that does not include killing
animals for food.
11. The last point is emphasized throughout STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999).
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For those who believe (as I do) that any general attack on the notion
of animal rights is implausible," and who notice that a growing commit-
ment to animal welfare is an unmistakable part of modem public law, the
strategy of disaggregation seems best suited to producing both analytical clarity
and future progress. To this end, I offer a recommendation that is modest
but that would do considerable good. Animal welfare statutes should be
amended to grant a private cause of action against those who violate them, so
as to allow private claimants, either human beings or animals, to supplement
currently weak agency enforcement efforts. This recommendation applies
both to federal statutes, above all the AWA, and also to state anticruelty
statutes in which public enforcement efforts should be complemented by
private rights of action on behalf of animals.
I. ANIMAL RIGHTS IN ACTION
Without much fanfare or advance foresight, American law has come
to recognize a wide array of protections for animals." Indeed, it would not
be too much to say that federal and state law now guarantees a robust set of
animal rights, 4 at least nominally. Some people believe that while animals
lack rights, human beings have duties toward them. 5 It is not clear what
12. See, e.g., RACHELS, supra note 1, at 130.
13. Remarkably little academic attention has been given to this development. Relevant
discussion can be found in Anita Dichter, Legal Definitions of Cruelty and Animal Rights, 7 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 147, 151-60 (1978), and Susan L. Goodkin, The Evolution of Animal Rights,
18 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 259, 260-67 (1987).
14. American law thus rejects Kant's view that animals are mere things and that any duties
owed to them really involve duties owed to people. "But so far as animals are concerned we have no
direct duties. Animals... are there merely as means to an end. That end is man." IMMANUEL
KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 239 (Louis Infield trans., Harper & Row 1978) (1930). The reason
to avoid cruelty to animals is that "he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings
with men." Id. at 240.
15. Thus, Kant believed that indirect duties were due to animals only for the sake of
human beings. See id.; see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 512 (1971):
While I have not maintained that the capacity for a sense of justice is necessary in order
to be owed the duties of justice, it does seem that we are not required to give strict justice
anyway to creatures lacking this capacity. But it does not follow that there are no require-
ments at all in regard to them .... Certainly it is wrong to be cruel to animals and the destruc-
tion of a whole species can be a great evil. The capacity of feelings for pleasure and pain
and for the forms of life of which animals are capable clearly impose duties of compassion
and humanity in their case. I shall not attempt to explain these considered beliefs. They
are outside the scope of the theory of justice ....
Id. This is a brief passage, almost an aside, and it is not clear what Rawls means by "strict justice."
An obvious problem is why "the" theory of justice should find the question of fairness to animals
outside of its scope. See also id. at 505 (noting the emphasis on "moral persons" with, among other
things, an ability to have a sense of justice, as those to whom "equal justice" is owed, a suggestion
that raises obvious problems for, e.g., the mentally retarded). My suspicion, though I cannot
1336 47 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1333 (2000)
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turns on this distinction, a point to which I will return. But it is clear that
as a matter of positive law, animals have rights in the same sense that peo-
ple do, at least under the many statutes that are enforceable only by public
officials. 6
A. State Law: Cruelty, Expansively Construed
The common law contained some uncertainty about cruelty to animals,
but it was essentially unreceptive to claims of rights violations. Courts gener-
ally suggested that such cruelty was not unlawful unless it worked an injury
to the owner, who was the essential rights holder;7 but on rare occasions,
the courts concluded that cruelty could count as a common law misde-
meanor."s The first animal protection law of the West apparently came from
the Puritans of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, who enacted a "Body of Liber-
ties" that prohibited "any Tirranny or Crueltie towards any bruite Creature
which are usuallie kept for man's use."' 9 The common law has of course been
superseded by state statutes, and every state now purports to provide signifi-
cant safeguards against cruelty or mistreatment of animals. It is now said in
many jurisdictions that "animals have rights which, like those of human
beings, are to be protected."20 In many ways, the relevant provisions are
broadly phrased and seem to offer significant safeguards; but in practice,
enforcement activity is sporadic and unreliable.2
What is perhaps most striking is that the relevant statutes go well beyond
beating, injuring, and the like, and impose affirmative duties on people with
animals in their care. Omissions may count as cruelty; so too may overworking
establish the point here, is that the evident problems with entirely excluding animals from the
topic of justice raise difficulties for contractarian theories in general.
16. This is true, for example, of many criminal and regulatory statutes that do not create
private rights of action. Of course the words "at least" are important; duties created by the criminal
law are generally accompanied by parallel common law rights, so that people ordinarily have rights to
protect themselves in the event that the prosecutor fails to act. But this is not always the case; under
the Federal Trade Commission Act, to take one of many examples, there is no private right of
action. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1994). It is important here to avoid purely semantic dis-
agreements; the only point is that animals have rights in the same sense that people have many
rights that they cannot enforce on their own.
17. See, e.g., McCausland v. People, 145 P. 685, 686 (Colo. 1914); Waters v. People, 46 P.
112, 115 (Colo. 1896); Allen v. Commonwealth, 77 Pa. Super. 244, 247 (1921).
18. See, e.g., The Stage Horse Cases, 15 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 51, 59 (1873); Isaac Ross' Case, 3
NEW YORK CITY HALL RECORDER 191,191-92 (1818).
19. STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARDS LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS 43
(2000).
20. State v. Karstendiek, 22 So. 845, 847 (La. 1897).
21. See FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 119-33.
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or underfeeding animals, or depriving them of adequate protection.22 Owners
must offer adequate sustenance and shelter.23 As a matter of statutory text,
defenses and excuses are quite limited. Protection of life or property is
a defense against a charge of unlawful killing of an animal, but there must
be a reasonable proportion between the danger presented and the action
taken;24 anger, intoxication, and impulse provide neither defense nor excuse.25
Consider a representative set of provisions. Anyone who has impounded
or confined an animal is obliged to provide good air, water, shelter, and
food.2" Criminal penalties are imposed on anyone who transports an animal
in a cruel or inhumane manner, or in such a way as to subject it to torture or
suffering; and these conditions can result from neglect.27 People who transport
an animal on railroads or in cars are required to let the animal out for rest,
feeding, and water every five hours.2" Those who abandon an animal, including
a pet, face criminal penalties.29 It is unlawful to torture, beat, maim, or kill any
animal, and also fail to provide adequate food and drink.0 Indeed, it is gen-
erally a crime not to provide the necessary sustenance, food, water, shelter, and
protection from severe weather." Most states forbid overworking an animal,
or using it for work when it is not physically fit.12 Compare, in this regard,
the unusually protective California statute, which imposes criminal liability
on the negligent as well as intentional overworking, overdriving, or torturing
of animals." "Torture" is defined not in its ordinary language sense, but
includes any act or omission "whereby unnecessary or unjustified physical
pain or suffering is caused or permitted."34
22. See 3A C.J.S. Animals § 101 (1973).
23. See, e.g., State v. Groseclose, 171 P.2d 863, 864-65 (Idaho 1946); Ames v. State, 11Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 385, 390 (1911); State v. Goodall, 175 P. 857, 858 (Or. 1918).24. See Rushin v. State, 267 S.E.2d 473, 474 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Libby, 556 A.2d1099, 1100 (Me. 1989); Grizzle v. State, 707 P.2d 1210, 1212 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985). On the
relation between statutes preventing cruelty to animals and medical or scientific experimentation,
see Thomas R. Malia, Annotation, Applicability of State Animal Cruelty Statute to Medical or Scien-
tific Experimentation Employing Animals, 42 A.L.R. 4th 860, 861-63 (1985).
25. See 3A C.J.S. Animals § 106 (1973).
26. See N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 356 (Consol. 1991).
27. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 597a (West 1999).
28. See N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAw § 359.
29. See id. § 355.
30. See id. § 353.
31. See, e.g., Griffith v. State, 43 S.E. 251, 252 (Ga. 1903); State v. Groseclose, 171 P.2d863, 864-65 (Idaho 1946); Reynolds v. State, 569 N.E.2d 680, 682 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Com-
monwealth v. Lufkin, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 579, 581 (1863).32. See Commonwealth v. Wood, 111 Mass. 408, 410 (1873); State v. Prince, 94 A. 966,
966 (N.H. 1915); State v. Goodall, 175 P. 857, 858 (Or. 1918).
33. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 597b (West 1999).
34. Id. § 599b.
HeinOnline  -- 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1338 1999-2000
There are three noteworthy points about state prohibitions on cruelty to
animals. First, enforcement can occur only through public prosecution; the
state has a monopoly on implementation." This point is important because
prosecution occurs only in a subset of the most egregious cases; there is a
great deal of difference between what these statutes ban and what in prac-
tice is permitted to occur. 6 Private enforcement would obviously reduce this
difference. 7 Second, duties to animals, and the correlative rights of animals,
exist largely by virtue of a particular relationship voluntarily assumed by human
beings-such as that of owner, transporter, or driver. There are no obliga-
tions of good samaritanship, for example, or affirmative obligations to animals
not within one's domain or care. In these ways, the network of duties to
animals tracks the corresponding network for duties to human beings, many
of which are enforced publicly rather than privately, and which generally do
not include obligations of good samaritanship. Third, and perhaps most impor-
tant, state law protections do not apply to the use of animals for medical
or scientific purposes, to cruelty toward farm animals, and to the production
and use of animals as food; here, cruel and abusive practices are generally
unregulated at the state level.
It would be an overstatement to say that the relevant provisions are
entirely symbolic. But because they are dependent on prosecutorial deci-
sions, and because few prosecutors have them as a high priority, they have a
largely expressive function. They say much more than they do. They express
an aspiration, but one that is routinely violated in practice, and violated with
impunity.
B. Federal Law: Species, Mammals, Horses, Others
In the last several decades, a remarkable number of federal statutes have
been enacted to protect species, animals, and animal welfare. Over fifty such
statutes are now in place,39 and the number is growing. The most famous of
these statutes is the Endangered Species Act,' designed to protect threatened
or endangered species against extinction. The act, which is enforced publicly
35. The only exception is that animal owners also have actions in property or tort to recover
the monetary equivalent of damage done to all objects within their possession, including animals.
36. See FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 129-33.
37. This is an evident motivation for the recommendation in Steven M. Wise, Recovery of
Common Law Damages for Emotional Distress, Loss of Society, and Loss of Companionship for the Wrong-
fid Death of a Companion Animal, 4 ANIMAL L. 33, 34 (1998).
38. See FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 160.
39. See generally Cohen, supra note 1.
40. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
1339Standin for Animals
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rather than privately, raises a number of knotty standing problems.4' A great
deal of litigation has involved the meaning of the Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Act,42 which imposes a selective moratorium on the taking and impor-
tation of marine mammals and marine mammal products.43 A particular
provision outlaws commercial whaling.' It also requires the Secretary of the
Interior to issue regulations to protect marine mammals from unlawful
activity. 5
Federal law contains a number of more specialized provisions. An
important statute is specifically designed to protect horses from cruel treat-
ment, and in particular to protect the exploitation of injured horses.' The
key statute involving game parks provides, "no person shall kill any game in
said park except under an order from the Secretary of the Interior for the
protection of persons or to protect or prevent the extermination of other
animals or birds."47 Another statute is designed to protect the habitats of
migratory birds and mammals, including bears, moose, and wolves in the
Norbeck Wildlife Preserve.48 Federal law imposes a moratorium on the impor-
tation of raw and worked ivory to help protect the African elephant.49 It is a
federal crime to shoot birds, fish, or mammals from an aircraft, or to use an
aircraft to harass birds, fish, or other animals." It is also a federal crime to kill
or harass wild horses or burros5 and to possess, sell, buy, or transport any bald
or golden eagle, alive or dead.52 The Secretary of Agriculture is charged with
ensuring that the slaughtering of animals is "humane,"53 and Congress lists two
methods that are designed to ensure "rapid and effective" killing.54
C. A Federal Bill of Rights for Animals?
In terms of animal protection, by far the most important measure is the
AWA, which imposes a wide range of negative constraints and affirmative
41. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571-78 (1992).
42. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421.
43. See id. § 1371.
44. See id. § 1372(0.
45. See id. § 1373(a).
46. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1831 (1994); see also Thornton v. United States Dep't of
Agric., 715 F.2d 1508, 1511 (llth Cir. 1983).
47. 16 U.S.C. § 352.
48. See id. § 676.
49. See id. §§ 4201-4245.
50. See id. § 742j-1.
51. See id. § 1338.
52. See id. § 668(a).
53. See 7 U.S.C. § 1901 (1994).
54. Id. § 1902.
1340 47 UCLA LAw REVIEW 1333 (2000)
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duties on those who deal in or with animals." The act begins with an elabo-
rate statement of purposes, emphasizing the need for "humane care and treat-
ment" in the exhibition of animals, and the "use" of animals "as pets.
''56 There
is a flat ban on commercial ventures in which animals are supposed to fight."
Licenses are required for all those who sell animals for exhibition or as pets."
The Secretary is also asked to issue "humane standards" with respect to "the
purchase, handling, or sale of animals" by "dealers, research facilities, and
exhibitors at auction sales." 9
The key provision of the statute requires the Secretary to issue "stan-
dards to govern the humane handling, care, treatment, and transportation
of animals by dealers, research facilities, and exhibitors. '  ' These are sup-
posed to include "minimum requirements" that govern "handling, housing,
feeding, watering, sanitation, ventilation, shelter from extremes of weather
and temperatures, [and] adequate veterinary care. ' 1 A separate provision
requires minimum requirements for "exercise of dogs" and "for a physical
environment adequate to promote the psychological well-being of pri-
mates." 6' Animals in research facilities must be protected through require-
ments that "ensure that animal pain and distress are minimized."
'63 In "any
practice which could cause pain to animals," a veterinarian must be con-
sulted in planning, and tranquilizers, analgesics, and anesthetics must be
used.6 An independent provision requires compliance by the national
government with the Secretary's standards. 65  Dog and cat breeders must
allow inspections' and may not transport underage dogs.67 The act also contains
a set of recordkeeping requirements, designed to ensure that dealers, exhibi-
tors, research facilities, and handlers provide records, thereby allowing fed-
eral monitoring of the treatment of animals. 8
Most state statutes do some of the work of the AWA by forbidding
cruelty and requiring adequate nutrition and shelter. But the act goes
55. See id. §§ 2131-2159.
56. Id. § 2131(1).
57. See id. § 2156.
58. See id. § 2134.
59. Id. § 2142.
60. Id. § 2143(a)(1).
61. Id. § 2143(a)(2)(A).
62. Id. §2143 (a)(2)(B); see also Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Secretary of Agric.,
813 F. Supp. 882, 886 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated, 29 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
63. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(3)(A); see also Lesser v. Espy, 34 F.3d 1301 (7th Cit. 1994).
64. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(3)(C)(i)-(ii).
65. See id. § 2143.
66. See id. § 2146.
67. See id. § 2143(h); see also Cox v. United States Dep't of Agric., 925 F.2d 1102, 1104
(8th Cir. 1991).
68. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2140, 2142.
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beyond state law by imposing a federal presence and also by imposing numerous
requirements not contained in state law. These involve requirements of exer-
cise for dogs, minimizing pain and distress to animals used in research, ade-
quate veterinary care in general, recordkeeping, and a physical environment
that will promote the psychological well-being of primates.
By virtue of its scope, the AWA promises an ambitious set of safe-
guards against cruel or injurious practices; taken together with other federal
statutes, above all the Marine Mammal Protection Act, it suggests that
national law is committed to something not so very different from a bill of
rights for animals. But there are important limitations in the statute. Per-
haps most important, it does not apply to the treatment of animals raised
for food or clothing. In fact, no federal statute regulates the treatment of
animals used for food or food production on farms, and states typically exempt
farm animals from anticruelty statutes. In addition, the AWA has an odd
pattern of inclusion and exclusion. There is a requirement for the exercise
of dogs, but no such requirement for the exercise of horses, who have at
least an equivalent need; the relevant physical environment must promote
the psychological well-being of primates, but no comparable protections
apply to dogs, cats, and horses.
Many people have also complained that the statute has been indiffer-
ently or even unlawfully enforced, not least via regulations that do far less
than the statute requires.69 The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
has hardly been eager to enforce the AWA, for which it lacks much in the
way of enforcement resources, and neither citizens nor animals have been
given an express cause of action against facilities that are in violation.0
Here too, there is a question whether statutory law is not largely expressive
and symbolic, a statement of good intentions, delivering far more on paper
than in the real world.7 An important question therefore becomes: Who
has standing to bring suit to require compliance with laws governing animal
welfare?
II. STANDING: HUMAN BEINGS, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND ANIMAL WELFARE
Under current doctrine, Article III is understood to require plaintiffs
to show (1) an injury in fact that (2) is a result of the action of the defen-
69. See, e.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 430-31 (D.C.
Cir. 1998); Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1994).70. See International Primate Protection League v. Institute for Behavioral Research, Inc.,
799 F.2d 934, 939-40 (4th Cir. 1986).
71. See FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 185-250.
1342
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dant and that (3) would be redressed by a decree on the plaintiffs behalf.7"
There are also "prudential" requirements, that is, standing rules that can be
eliminated if Congress does so expressly. The most important of these require
(1) that the injury be "arguably within the zone of interests" protected or
regulated by the statute in action73 and (2) that the injury not be widely
generalized, that is, it must not be shared by all or most citizens. Under
what circumstances do these requirements permit or bar an action brought
to prevent unlawful injury done to an animal? The most general question is
when human beings may invoke their own injuries in fact to challenge harms
done to animals. I suggest here that three kinds of injuries are relevant:
deprivation of information, competitive injury, and aesthetic harm. My major
interest here is unpacking the implications of current standing doctrine in this
unusual context; I deal below with further complexities.
A. Existing Law: Informational Standing
It is now established that Congress can confer on citizens--even on
citizens as a whole-a right to obtain information. 5 It is also established
that Congress can give citizens-even all citizens-a right to bring suit to
vindicate that interest. 6 If Congress says that people have a right to infor-
mation of a certain kind, and if that information is denied, Congress is per-
mitted to say that the deprivation of information counts as an injury in fact
for which suit may be brought.
These points suggest the first route by which people might have stand-
ing to protect the rights of animals. Suppose, for example, that a statute
obliges laboratories and zoos to provide to the government, or even the public
at large, information about the treatment of animals within their care. Sup-
pose, further, that it is urged that under the government's legally insufficient
regulations, far less information is forthcoming than would be available under
a legally sufficient regulation. If Congress has granted standing to any
person to contest violations of this duty of disclosure, there should be no
72. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693, 704
(2000); Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20-21 (1998); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 571-78 (1992).
73. See National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 488
(1998); Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 395-96 (1987); Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
74. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 19-20 (holding that Congress could give standing to "any per-
son" to require disclosure of information about an alleged "political committee").
75. See id. For a general discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Standing and Infor-
mational Regulation: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613 (1999).
76. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25.
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constitutional obstacle to the suit. The deprivation of the requisite
information counts as the injury in fact. Provisions of the AWA require
public reports about the treatment of animals,77 and if Congress grants citizens
a right to obtain that information, standing should be available.
The "if" in the preceding sentence is an extremely important qualifica-
tion, for Congress has not given citizens standing to seek information that
bears on animal welfare. Neither the AWA nor the Marine Mammal Pro-
tection Act contains any such grant. Because Congress has not spoken
clearly, plaintiffs must rely on the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
which requires them to show (1) that their injury is arguably within the
zone of interests protected or regulated by the statute and (2) that their
injury is not too widely generalized. Thus, for example, if a plaintiff is
unable to distinguish himself from other citizens complaining of unlawful
deprivation of information involving the treatment of animals, his injury
will probably be held too widely generalized to be cognizable. And in some
cases, the plaintiff's interests might be deemed too far afield of the interests
protected or regulated by the statute.
Consider in this regard Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy.79
There the Animal Legal Defense Fund and the Humane Society of the
United States challenged what they saw as an unduly narrow definition of
animal for purposes of the AWA, a definition that would exclude birds,
rats, and mice. The plaintiffs claimed injury from the fact that the narrow
definition of animal undermined "their attempts to gather and disseminate
information on laboratory conditions for those animals.' 's With a broader
definition, laboratories would be required to provide more information about
their treatment of animals, and the plaintiffs contended that they would
use that information in "public education and rulemaking proceedings.""' The
narrow definition of animal also made it harder for the plaintiffs to educate
the laboratories about the "humane treatment of birds, rats and mice." 2
It is clear that the plaintiffs would have had standing if Congress had
expressly said that they have standing. But under the APA, the court held
77. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (1994).
78. The only arguable exception is the Endangered Species Act, which does give standing
to any person, but not to receive information. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994). Of course the
opportunity to see a member of an endangered species may provide information, but that is a dif-
ferent matter; in that case, a person with a clear travel plan has standing. See Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563-64 (1992).
79. 23 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
80. Id. at 501.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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otherwise. Its central holding was that the informational injury did not fall
within the zone of interests of the statute. The Animal Legal Defense Fund
was not attempting to protect its members' own legal rights, but "simply
to educate all those who desire to promote the statute's substantive purposes." '
Informational standing would require not merely a "general corporate purpose
to promote the interests to which the statute is addressed," but also "a con-
gressional intent to benefit the organization or some indication that the organi-
zation is a 'peculiarly suitable challenger of administrative neglect."' 4 In this
regard, the court emphasized that the AWA creates an oversight committee
consisting of private citizens designed to ensure compliance with the act. Thus,
"the organizations are not the intended representatives of the public inter-
est in animal welfare.0
5
The general approach suggested in Espy is quite sound; sometimes those
who invoke rights under a statute protecting animal welfare will not be even
arguably within the statutory zone of interests. But the particular holding is
quite doubtful. As the Supreme Court has made clear, the zone of interests
test is not meant to be demanding," as suggested by the qualifier "arguably,"
and if any group is within the zone of interests of the act, members of the Ani-
mal Legal Defense Fund count as such. The strongest argument for the court's
conclusion is that the existence of the oversight committee should be taken
to negate standing for other private organizations concerned about inade-
quate enforcement." But this is a fragile argument. It would be at least as
plausible to say that private lawsuits do not displace, but complement, the
work of the oversight committee. For present purposes, what matters is less
the particular evaluation of Espy than the general suggestions-first, that
Congress can grant people standing to receive information relating to animal
welfare if it wishes to do so, and second, that for actions brought under the
APA, those who complain of a deprivation of information may suffer injury
in fact but fall outside the zone of statutorily protected interests. Whether
plaintiffs are arguably within that zone depends on the class of persons that
the statute is arguably designed to protect.
83. Id. at 503.
84. Id. (quoting Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 277, 283 (D.C.
Cir. 1988)).
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S.
479, 492 (1998); Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1987).
87. See Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 344 (1984) (holding that the
creation of specific standing for some negated standing for others who were not specifically granted
standing).
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B. Existing Law: Competitive Injuries
It has become a platitude to suggest that many apparently public-
spirited statutes are enacted, or take the form they do, because of the competi-
tive benefits they provide to individuals or companies with self-interested
stakes in the outcome.' If the government enforces such statutes inade-
quately, competitors might be injured in fact. The Supreme Court has been
quite willing to allow competitors to challenge unlawful governmental action
that is adverse to their interests.89 For example, the Court has allowed a set of
individual banks, and also the American Bankers Association, to challenge
agency action allowing credit unions to create multiple unrelated employer
groups, an action that, in the banks' view, would give credit unions an unlaw-
ful competitive advantage.9"
This line of cases raises legitimate (though not yet explored 1 ) possibilities
for human standing to protect animal welfare. Suppose, for example, that
the statute at issue places certain companies that are prepared to sacrifice
the well-being of animals at a competitive disadvantage, by forbidding those
companies from engaging in practices that would help them in the market-
place. A proposed statutory ban on the importation of products made with
dog or cat fur is an example;92 the ban would plainly help companies that sell
ordinary or synthetic fur coats, because such companies would face less
competition. The existing cases on competitor standing suggest that such
companies would be fully entitled to sue to produce legally required enforce-
ment action. Or suppose that a statute designed to protect animal welfare is
obeyed by some commercial actors but not by others; suppose too that
compliance is costly and hence those who disobey the statute are at a
competitive advantage (as is highly likely). At first glance, a company that
complies with the AWA (in testing pain-relief products, for example)
would seem to have standing to challenge governmental practices that allow
its competitors to gain an economic advantage.
There are two obstacles to competitor standing in this context. First,
the competitor must be arguably within the zone of interests protected by
the statute, and in some cases, it is easy to imagine an argument that the
88. For the classic demonstration in the context of environmental law, see generally
BRUCE ACKERMAN & WILLIAM HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981).
89. See, e.g., National Credit Union, 522 U.S. at 488; Clarke, 479 U.S. at 403; Association
of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-52 (1970).
90. See National Credit Union, 522 U.S. at 488.
91. I have been unable to find any case in which a litigant invoked competitive injuries in
challenging violations of a statute designed to protect animals. But as the text explains, there should
be many opportunities.
92. See Dog and Cat Protection Act of 2000, 106th Cong. § 4(a) (not introduced).
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competitor's interests are simply too far afield.93 Whether the argument is
convincing depends on the particular statute and on whether its background
reveals a lack of concern with the plaintiffs interests. The cases suggest that
courts are quite willing to presume that statutes do show such an interest,
and hence competitor standing is highly likely.94 Second, a competitor
might have problems along the dimension of redressability. If, for example,
a statute were applied to forbid the importation of coats lined with cat fur,
how exactly would any particular competitor be helped? The cases suggest
that competitor standing will be presumed in cases of this kind,9" but the issue
raises a number of complexities. I return to this point below.
C. Existing Law: Aesthetic Injuries
In many cases, plaintiffs objecting to harm done to an animal seek to
claim an "aesthetic injury." The plaintiff contends that the unlawful mis-
treatment of animals imposes some kind of aesthetic or recreational injury
on the plaintiff. In a number of these cases, standing is available. But there is
considerable conflict in the lower courts, and the outcomes seem quite unruly
and even odd. Let us begin with some simple polar cases.
1. No injuries and no plans. Suppose that a citizen, activist, or researcher
objects to the unlawful and inhumane treatment of animals in a certain
facility; the facility may be a zoo, or it may be a laboratory engaged in experi-
mentation. Suppose that the citizen, activist, or researcher attempts to bring
suit. On the facts as stated, the outcome is clear: Standing is unavailable,
for there is no injury in fact. The plaintiffs have only an ideological interest
in the dispute, and they are attempting to enforce the law for its own sake.
Under current law, there is universal agreement on this point.96 The key
case is Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,97 a case in which the plaintiffs, including
people interested in seeing and studying members of an endangered species,
challenged a federal decision not to apply the Endangered Species Act
extraterritorially." The Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because
they had no plan to visit the members of the species; whether they had a
93. See, e.g., Air Courier Conference of Am. v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S.
517, 529-30 (1991) (holding that postal workers lack standing to challenge a postal regulation
allowing international mail activity by private couriers).
94. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 89.
96. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972); Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93,
96 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
97. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
98. See id. at 558.
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concrete interest of this kind was, on a reasonable reading of the complaint,
purely speculative. Thus, they failed to show an injury in fact. Along the
same lines, consider Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Weinberger,9 in which
the plaintiffs sought to enjoin aerial shooting of goats on a military enclave
for which public access was unavailable. The court held that standing was
unavailable because the members did not visit the enclave and hence
lacked any concrete injury. °°
2. Plans, scientists, visitors. Now assume that certain scientists and
researchers are attempting to see and study members of a particular species;
that their desire to see and study the relevant animals is imminent and
definite rather than conjectural; and that they challenge government action
that, on their view, will reduce the supply of animals available for study. Under
current law, it appears uncontroverted that the scientists and researchers
have standing. ' In Defenders of Wildlife, the Court acknowledged as much,
suggesting that if the plaintiffs had procured a plane ticket, the injury-in-
fact requirement would be met. 2 The injury in fact consists of the reduced
likelihood that they will be able to engage in the relevant research.
As we will see, questions might be raised about this analysis, but the law
appears settled on the point. The key case is Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American
Cetacean Society."3 There, several wildlife conservation groups, including
members who were committed to watching and studying whales, objected to
the failure of the Secretary of Commerce to certify that nationals in Japan
were engaged in acts diminishing the effectiveness of the International Con-
vention for the Regulation of Whaling. The consequence of certification of
Japan by the Secretary of Commerce would have been to require the Secretary
of State to reduce, by at least 50 percent, Japan's fishing allocation within the
United States." In a brief discussion in a footnote, the Court held that the
wildlife organizations had standing. "[Tihey undoubtedly have alleged a suffi-
cient 'injury in fact' in that the whale watching and studying of their members
will be adversely affected by continued whale harvesting .... ,005 Indeed, the
same conclusion applies not only to scientists and researchers, but also to
everyone with an interest in observing members of the relevant species, even
if the interest is "for purely aesthetic purposes. 1 6 Thus, in Animal Welfare
99. 765 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1985).
100. See id. at 938-39.
101. See, e.g., Babbitt, 46 F.3d at 97.
102. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564. Note, however, that a plurality of the Court
doubted that the redressability requirements would be met even in that event. See infra Part lI.D.3.
103. 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
104. See id. at 226.
105. Id. at 231 n.4.
106. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562-63.
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Institute v. Kreps,' °' the court held that members of the plaintiff organization
had standing to challenge a waiver of the moratorium on marine mammal
importation under the Marine Mammal Protection Act."~ The court
referred to the ability of the members "to see, photograph, and enjoy Cape
fur seals alive in their natural habitat under conditions in which the ani-
mals are not subject to excessive harvesting, inhumane treatment and slaugh-
ter of pups that are very young and still nursing. ''Ic9
3. Visitors and observers interested in observing a member of a species that
is neither threatened nor endangered. The intermediate cases, the difficult ones
under current law, arise when there is no argument that the species is threat-
ened or endangered, but when a plaintiff alleges that the difficult conditions
faced by the animal will cause an injury in fact, defined in aesthetic terms,
to the plaintiff. Suppose, for example, that someone who visits a zoo, or a
stable, objects to the cruel and unlawful treatment of an animal on the
premises. An obvious oddity here is that the plaintiff is likely to be concerned
ethically or morally, not aesthetically-at least if the notion of the aesthetic
is taken to refer to judgments, neither ethical nor moral in character, but
rather about beauty or ugliness. Nonetheless, it is the aesthetic injury that
is the basis for the suit.
As we will see, a recent Supreme Court decision seems to resolve this
question in favor of plaintiffs."' But the case most directly on point is Animal
Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman,"' in which an en banc panel for the
D.C. Circuit was sharply divided. In that case, Marc Jurnove, an employee
and a volunteer for animal relief and rescue organizations, complained about
what he believed to be the unlawful treatment of many animals at the Long
Island Game Farm Park and Zoo. Jumove contended that he had visited
the park at least nine times between May 1995 and June 1996, and that the
unlawful and inhumane treatment caused "injury to this aesthetic interest
in observing animals living under humane conditions.'. 2 Thus, Jumove did
not urge that he had a special interest in the decent treatment of animals by
107. 561 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
108. See id. at 1006.
109. Id. at 1007 (quoting plaintiffs complaint); see also Humane Soc'y of the United States
v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (allowing society members who visited wildlife refuges
standing to challenge a ruling that expanded hunting rights on the ground that members would be
subjected to environmental degradation, fewer numbers of animals, and corpses); Alaska Fish &
Wildlife Fed'n v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 1987) (granting standing to those "who
wish to hunt, photograph, observe, or carry out scientific studies on ... migratory birds," in the con-
text of a challenge to agreements that would permit the hunting of such birds in Alaska).
110. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693, 700 (2000).
111. 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
112. Id. at 431.
1349Standiny for Animals
HeinOnline  -- 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1349 1999-2000
1350 47 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1333 (2000)
virtue of his service as an employee and a volunteer for animal relief and
rescue organizations. What mattered was that he was a visitor to the zoo.
The court held that the aesthetic interest counted as an injury in fact
and that Jurnove had far more than an abstract interest in law enforcement
for its own sake."3 In the court's view, Jumove established an aesthetic
interest that he had repeatedly attempted to promote by "visiting a particular
animal exhibition to observe particular animals there."'114 Thus, the court
concluded that an injury in fact could be established "to a plaintiff's interest
in the quality and condition of an environmental area that he used."'"5 The
court also concluded that Jurnove could satisfy the two causation
requirements. First, the current USDA regulations allegedly permitted the
conditions of which Jurnove complained; thus, the injury was due to the
government's action. Standing would be found for "plaintiffs who claimed
aesthetic injury... based on the government's failure to adequately regulate
a third party."'"6  Second, the injury would be redressed by a decree in
Jurnove's favor, for "more stringent regulations... would necessarily
alleviate [his] aesthetic injury during his planned, future trips to the Game
Farm."
117
The dissenting judges contended that none of the Article III require-
ments had been met. They contended that for those complaining of an injury
to the aesthetic interest in observing animals, standing was limited to
"diminution-of-the-species.".. By itself, aesthetic injury, "a matter of indi-
vidual taste," could not justify standing."9  Aesthetic injury, thus
understood, was no different from the interest in law enforcement for its
own sake. In their view, Jurnove's claim would allow standing for those
seeking to view "animals in any manner that does not comport with" the
plaintiffs "individual taste."' Thus "a sadist with an interest in seeing animals
kept under inhumane conditions" would have standing to contest the humane
treatment.12 1 In other words, this was a purely subjective interest, not a legally
cognizable one.
The dissenters urged as well that Jumove could not show sufficient causa-
tion. The inhumane treatment was not caused by the government; it was
caused by the zoo. Thus, the dissenters found it "frightening at a constitutional
113. See id. at 432.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 436.
116. Id. at 440.
117. Id. at 443.
118. Id. at 448.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 448-49.
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level" to suggest "that the government causes everything that it does not
prevent."'2 A judicial order invalidating the regulation and directing the
USDA to promulgate a new regulation would mandate new conditions at
parks and zoos, but "it would require sheer speculation to presume that any
enrichment devices specified in a future regulation would satisfy Jurnove's
aesthetic tastes. 123 Thus, it was far too conjectural to connect the decree
sought to the protection of the interests invoked by Jurnove.
If the goal is simply to describe current law, the majority view seems
correct. In Japan Whaling, and in the cases that follow it, courts did not say
that an injury in fact would exist if and only if the action at issue would
diminish the number of members of the species. Indeed, in its decision in
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.,"' the
Supreme Court said that an injury in fact could exist merely on the basis of
a reasonable perception of an environmental harm, even if there were no
finding of an environmental harm."5 The case involved water pollution from
the unlawful release of mercury, a toxic pollutant. The district court found
"no demonstrated proof of harm to the environment" from the mercury
discharge violations.' The Supreme Court found it sufficient to refer to affida-
vits pointing to perceived harms, such as smells and appearances of pollution,
deterred fishing and camping, and reluctance to picnic, fish, hike, and (most
important for present purposes) to watch birds. 7 There was no evidence that
birds were actually injured, nor could it be shown that pollution had produced
smells or impaired fishing and hiking. Nonetheless, the Court found the requi-
site injury in fact.
It would seem to follow that an aesthetic or recreational injury, rooted
in reactions to animal suffering, would create the requisite injury in fact. Nor
is it clear why "diminution of the species" should count as an injury in fact
and harms of the sort invoked by Jurnove should not. If the question is
whether the plaintiff has suffered an injury, why, after Laidlaw, are the two
different? On the merits, the majority seems clearly right. At the same
time, there are serious problems in the majority's analysis, a point to which
I return below.
Plaintiffs who complain of an aesthetic or recreational injury will be
able to bring suit if Congress expressly grants them a right to do so, at least
if they can meet the causation requirements, discussed below. But without
122. Id. at 452.
123. Id. at 454.
124. 120 S. Ct. 693 (2000).
125. See id. at 704-05.
126. Id. at 704.
127. See id.
Stanclin for Animals 1351
HeinOnline  -- 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1351 1999-2000
an express grant, plaintiffs must rely on the APA, and they must show both
that they are arguably within the zone of interests protected by the relevant
statute and that their interest is different from that of citizens generally. In
cases brought under the AWA, for those plaintiffs interested in observing
animals and in ensuring that the observation is not adversely affected by
unlawful acts injurious to animal welfare, the zone of interests test seems easily
met.
D. Evaluation
1. Injuries without injuries? As noted, those without an injury in fact are
not entitled to bring suit. But what is an injury in fact? In the environmental
area, it is well known that some people are willing to pay a certain amount,
sometimes a very large amount, to ensure the existence of endangered
species."' The United States government takes account of "existence value"
in calculating the costs and benefits of certain courses of action."9 If some-
one is willing to pay for the existence of some animal or set of animals, in what
sense is that person not injured when the animal is killed?3'
I do not mean to suggest that this question cannot be answered. Per-
haps it could be said that someone who is willing to pay for some state of
affairs wants that state of affairs to exist, but that the injury that comes from
the disfavored state of affairs is not something that the legal system should,
or constitutionally may, treat as an injury in fact. On the conventional
understanding, this person is interested in law enforcement for its own sake,
or in a state of affairs that he supports for merely ideological reasons. He
feels harm from the violation, and he is willing to back that feeling with
dollars, but the harm is not the kind that the legal system should be pre-
pared to "see." What is important for present purposes is to recognize that
the legal system is denying that people suffer injury in fact for reasons that
involve not facts but judgments about what facts, and what harms, ought to
count for legal purposes. I return to this point below.
128. See, e.g., Daniel Kahemen & Jack L. Knetsch, Valuing Public Goals: The Purchase of
Moral Satisfaction, 22 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 57 (1992).
129. See Ohio v. Department of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
130. The injury-in-fact test has often been criticized on these grounds. See, e.g., David P.
Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 42; William Fletcher, The Structure
of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 229 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 163, 167 (1992); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) ("Mhe
plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact'-an invasion of a legally protected interest.");
International Primate Protection League v. Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 77 (1991) ("[Sltanding
is gauged by the specific common law, statutory, or constitutional claims that a party presents... [and]
should be seen as a question of substantive law, answerable by reference to the statutory and con-
stitutional provision whose protection is invoked[.]").
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2. Morals and aesthetics. The Glickman case, especially against the back-
drop of Laidlaw, raises fresh questions about the nature of the injury in fact
requirement. Many people wish to see animals; many people wish to see ani-
mals treated in certain ways. Do all such people always have standing when
their wishes are violated? One puzzle of the court's holding is that it seems
to offer an affirmative answer to this question. Another puzzle is that the
plaintiffs' real objections seem ethical or moral, not fundamentally aes-
thetic. A final puzzle is the court's suggestion that Jurnove, unlike a sadist,
has standing because his interest is legally protected: "[N]ot every aesthetic
interest can form the basis for a lawsuit; our injury-in-fact test protects only
those aesthetic interests that have been 'legally protected." ' . Let us attempt
to sort out these puzzles.
Of course people do not have standing whenever they have an aesthetic
injury-if this term refers to a subjective perception of disgust, distaste, or
offense. The requirement of injury in fact is designed to bar suits based
solely on perceptions of this sort. People in California might well feel disgust,
distaste, or offense if they hear of racial discrimination, or a commercial
development, on Long Island, but this does not give them standing. Under
current law, it is necessary for them to be harmed or materially affected by the
discrimination or commercial development. If their complaint involves com-
mercial development, they must visit the relevant area. But this point raises a
genuine problem about the conception of injury in fact. Surely the Glickman
dissenters are correct to doubt whether a sadist would have standing to
contest regulations that make conditions more humane for animals--even
though there is no doubting that a case can be imagined in which the sadist
suffers no less, in fact, than Jurnove. This point leaves the court's decision
open to the objection that it really depends on sympathy for Jumove on the
merits. But something else is at work. Recall that the court's answer is that
any injury in fact must be legally cognizable; it objects that the sadist would
have no legally cognizable interest. To this, the dissenting opinion, naturally
enough, objects that the response confuses the injury-in-fact inquiry with
an inquiry into whether the plaintiff is arguably within the zone of pro-
tected interests.
The objection is correct, but it does not count against the court's deci-
sion. There is no way to inquire into injury in fact without making inquir-
ies into law as well. People suffer injuries in fact every day, and these injuries
do not provide the basis for a suit in federal court.' The question is whether
131. Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 434 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560).
132. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 130, at 231-33; Sunstein, supra note 130, at 188-91.
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some source of law recognizes these injuries. Before the enactment of the
AWA, a person who complained of mistreatment of animals in a zoo would
have no cognizable injury, no interest protected by law. After the
enactment of the AWA, such mistreatment may well be unlawful, and
someone who complains about it will count as a proper plaintiff if he can
show a particular interest in its prevention. Jurnove certainly was able to
show this interest. The case would be different if a plaintiff never visited
the animals at all, not because such a nonvisitor would have no injury, but
because Congress has not given members of the general public a right to
bring suit to ensure law enforcement. A possible objection would be that
Congress conferred no cause of action on Jurnove. But under the APA as it
has come to be understood, someone who suffers a material injury is permit-
ted to bring suit so long as he is within the zone of protected interests and
stands apart from members of the general public. Of course, Congress can deny
standing to such people if it chooses to do so.
The basic conclusions are as follows. If Congress seeks to give stand-
ing to people to protect interests relating to the well-being of animals, it
must comply with the injury-in-fact requirement. That requirement is met
if a person has a nonspeculative plan to visit, study, or see the animals in
question. Under the APA, the same conclusion follows, with two qualifica-
tions: Plaintiffs must show that they fall within the zone of interests protected
by the statute, and they must also show that in terms of their interests and
concerns, they are different from citizens generally.
What about the apparently ethical or moral nature of Jurnove's com-
plaint (and those of others like him)? The central point here is that an ethical
or moral objection cannot by itself provide a basis for standing. If Jurnove has
an ethical objection to development off the coast of Maine, he does not have
standing for that reason; the question is whether he has some kind of personal
interest, not only ethical in nature, in the coast of Maine. Thus, the court's
decision is less odd than it may sound. So long as Jurnove can claim a genuine
aesthetic interest (and the interest could be scientific too), he is allowed to
bring suit, even if a large part of his motivation is ethical.
3. Redressability. The issue of redressability raises further puzzles. On the
authority of Japan Whaling, it seems generally agreed that those who fear the
loss of an animal or animals may bring suit to prevent governmental action
that threatens to create the loss. But there is some tension in the cases, par-
ticularly because the Japan Whaling Court did not deal with the redressability
problem, which, to get slightly ahead of the story, seems quite severe: How,
exactly, would a decree in favor of the American Cetacean Society, striking
down the government action at issue, actually benefit the Society's members,
even if they are greatly interested in watching whales?
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Note here that in Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court did not
merely hold that those without a particular plan to see or visit members of an
endangered species lacked standing. A plurality also said that the redress-
ability requirements were not met, for even if there was such a plan, the
injury was not a result of the government's action, nor would it be redressed
by a decree on the plaintiffs' behalf.' For example, the United States was
funding under 10 percent of the challenged development project; if the
United States withdrew funding, would there be any effect on the species that
the plaintiffs sought to preserve? The Court noted that "[rlespondents have
produced nothing to indicate that the projects they have named will either
be suspended, or do less harm to the listed species, if that fraction is
eliminated.""3 4 In addition, the Court noted that the defendant was the
Secretary of the Interior, not the relevant funding agencies. It was not clear
that the funding agencies would be bound, in law or in fact, by the decision
of the Secretary, even if he concluded that the Endangered Species Act
applied extraterritorially.
On this count, the plurality view in Defenders of Wildlife is in con-
spicuous tension with the majority view in both Federal Election Commission
v. Akins 35 and Japan Whaling, cases in which it was also contended that a
decree in the plaintiffs' favor would not redress their injury. How do these
cases bear on the redressability issue when human beings are attempting to
guard against harms to animals?
Consider first cases in which people seek to observe a species whose
numbers will allegedly be reduced as a result of government action. This was
the situation in Japan Whaling, in which the Court stated, in its footnote dis-
cussion, that continued whale harvesting would impair the members' interest
in whale watching and studying. This was a statement about injury in fact;
the Court did not discuss the redressability problems. Now it is clear that if
the action under review would result in the elimination or near-elimination
of whales, the redressability requirements would be met. But there were
several problems in the particular case. First, a decision to certify Japan-
what the plaintiffs sought-would not necessarily result in Japan's compliance
with the international conventions pertaining to the killing of whales. Per-
haps the only consequence would be that Japan would face sanctions from
the Secretary of State. Second, it is not at all clear that compliance by
133. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 567-69.
134. Id. at 571.
135. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
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Japan would have any material consequences for any member of the American
Cetacean Society. Even if fewer whales were killed, how exactly would that
redress the members' injury? The difficulty here is that the reduced number
of total whales would not necessarily cause any harm to the plaintiff; in all
probability its members would continue to be able to see whales. For this
reason, there is a possible objection to standing on the grounds of both
redressability and injury in fact.
These problems bring home an old point.'36 They show that in order
to know whether the redressability requirements are met, it is necessary to
know how to characterize the relevant injury. If the injury is characterized
as an adverse effect on the desire to see particular whales at particular times,
the plaintiffs will have a very difficult time in establishing standing. It is
quite speculative whether the relief sought in Japan Whaling would redress
that injury. But if the injury is characterized as an increased probability of
one kind or another-an increased probability, for example, that whales
would not be available for viewing-the causation requirements are plainly
met. There seems to be no way to decide how to characterize injuries with-
out looking at the harms that the underlying legal provision is aimed to
prevent. Japan Whaling must be understood as holding that the decreased
availability of whales is itself a legally cognizable injury under the relevant
law, and also that the increased likelihood of decreased availability, brought
about by the failure to certify Japan, counts as a legally cognizable injury. This
holding, to be defensible as such, must depend on some kind of charac-
terization of the injury with which the underlying source of law concerns itself.
Compare, for example, the Court's decision, in Northeastern Florida
Chapter v. Jacksonville,'37 that white construction contractors had standing
to challenge a racial set aside program, even though they could not show
that they would have received a contract without the program. The Court
held that the equal protection clause protects the opportunity to compete
on equal terms, and that injury would be redressed by a decree in the plain-
tiffs' favor."' Similarly, the cases recognizing standing for competitors must
be understood to have held that the redressability requirements were met,
not because any particular plaintiff would necessarily have benefited
materially (that would be speculative), but because the injury consisted of
136. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 37.
137. 508 U.S. 658 (1993).
138. See id. at 666.
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the inability to compete on the terms prescribed by Congress. From these
points we can see the weakness in the plurality's view on the redressability
issue in Defenders of Wildlife. The plaintiffs were complaining, not that par-
ticular members of species would die, but that there was an increased risk of
death as a result of the unlawful use of federal funds to sponsor the relevant
program. If the plaintiffs were correct on the law-and that was an issue for
the merits-the statute was designed to prevent American funds from being
used in programs that might result in the death of members of an endan-
gered species. The injury, so characterized, would have been redressed by a
decree in their favor.
For purposes of standing to protect against harm to animals, two con-
clusions follow. First, competitors who suffer injury in fact need not worry
about the redressability requirements, here or elsewhere. The risk of com-
petitive harm is the competitive injury, just as in the construction contractors
case, and the competitive injury, the basis for standing, would be redressed by
a decree in the plaintiffs' favor. Second, plaintiffs claiming aesthetic injuries
should have standing if they are complaining about the government's failure
to issue or enforce regulations that, if issued or enforced, would eliminate
those injuries. It is true that the alleged violator-a zoo, for example-could
ignore the government's enforcement activity. But the increased likelihood
of compliance is sufficient to satisfy the redressability requirements.
4. Competitors within the zone? The thrust of the discussion thus far has
been that the standing question should be focused on legislative instructions.
Injuries qualify as such if a statute qualifies them as such; whether an injury
is redressable depends on how it is characterized, and the best way to
characterize it is to examine the relevant source of law. But all of this does
raise a puzzle for at least some competitors. Perhaps some statutes protect-
ing animal rights or welfare are enacted in part because of their beneficial
effects on competitors. Others, however, are designed to protect animals and
have nothing to do with competitors at all, and the economic advantage is
entirely incidental.
This point suggests that an inspection of some statutes will show that
competitors are not even arguably within the zone.9 The best response would
point to the fact that competitive advantages, for those who comply with
the relevant laws, are a means to the end sought by the statute. In most
139. See, e.g., Air Courier Conference of Am. v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S.
517 (1991).
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cases, this response should be sufficient, though reasonable people will differ
in assessing statutes that are unclear on the point.
E. Summary
The discussion thus far has not been without some complexities, and it
is best summarized with a set of stylized cases.
1. A group of citizens concerned about animal suffering or about threats
to the continued existence of a species challenge government action that, in
their view, leads to unlawful harm to animals. On the facts as stated, no stand-
ing is available, even if Congress has conferred a cause of action on "any
person." The reason is that there is no injury in fact.
2. Same facts as the first case, but the group alleges that it has members
who wish to see, enjoy, or study the relevant animals. No standing is avail-
able, even if Congress has conferred a cause of action on "any person," because
on the facts as stated, no member has a sufficiently concrete plan in mind,
and hence there is no injury in fact.
3. A group of citizens seeks information bearing on the treatment of
animals under the AWA. The group contends that the information must be
both compiled and disclosed publicly. If Congress has granted a cause of action
to "any person," standing is available. If Congress has not conferred such a
cause of action, standing is unavailable for prudential reasons, because the
injury seems generalized, and the plaintiffs have not shown that they are argua-
bly within the zone of interests protected by the statute-unless (and this is an
important qualification) the group can establish that it has a special interest
in the information that distinguishes it from citizens generally and that it falls
within the zone of interests protected by the statute.
4. Someone who regularly visits a zoo challenges violations of the AWA
at that zoo. Standing is available if Congress has conferred a cause of action
on "any person." The case is somewhat more difficult without such a special
grant of standing, but the suit should be justiciable in that case as well,
because the injury-in-fact test is met: The plaintiff is within the zone of pro-
tected interests, and has an interest that distinguishes him from members of the
public as a whole (as a regular zoo visitor).
5. Company A, a producer of certain medicines, challenges commercial
practices by Company B. Company A contends that the practices of Com-
pany B are violative of the AWA and have led to the production of medicines
that serve as competition for Company A's products. Standing is probably
available, because Company A suffers an injury in fact, and because Com-
pany A is at least arguably within the zone of interests protected by the stat-
ute in question.
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III. Do ANIMALS HAVE STANDING?
A. A Simmering Dispute with a Simple Answer
Do animals have standing? Several cases so suggest. In Palila v. Hawaii
Department of Land & Natural Resources,'" the court said that "[als an endan-
gered species under the Endangered Species Act, the bird (Loxioides baiUeui),
a member of the Hawaiian honey-creeper family, also has legal status and
wings its way into federal court as a plaintiff in its own right."14' In a remarka-
bly large number of cases in the federal reports, animals appear as named
plaintiffs.142 But some courts have held that animals cannot bring suit in their
own name. 43 Of course, any animals who are entitled to bring suit in this
way would be represented by counsel, who would owe guardian-like obliga-
tions and make decisions, subject to those obligations, on the clients' behalf.
But this type of proceeding is hardly foreign to our law; consider suits brought
on behalf of children or corporations.
From the discussion thus far, it should be clear that the question
of whether animals have standing depends on the content of positive law.
If Congress has not given standing to animals, the issue is at an end. Gener-
ally, of course, Congress grants standing to persons, as it does under the
general standing provisions of the APA,'4 the Marine Mammal Protection
Act, 45 and the Endangered Species Act.146 Indeed, I have not been able to find
any federal statute that allows animals to sue in their own name. As a rule,
the question is therefore quite clear: Animals lack standing as such, simply
because no relevant statute confers a cause of action on animals.
B. The Question of Legislative Power
It seems possible, however, that before long, Congress will grant standing
to animals to protect their own rights and interests. 47 Congress might do this
in the belief that in some contexts, it will be hard to find any person with
140. 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
141. Id. at 1107 (citation omitted).
142. See, e.g., Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Yeutter, 930 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1991); Northern
Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash. 1991); Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F.
Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
143. See Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. New England Aquarium,
836 F. Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1993); Hawaiian Crow v. Lujan, 905 F. Supp. 549, 552 (D. Haw. 1991).
144. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994) (referring to "a person suffering legal wrong").
145. See 16 U.S.C. § 1377 (1994).
146. See id. § 1540.
147. This would be a far more limited step than that urged by Steven Wise. See WISE, supra
note 19, at 43 (calling for the recognition of chimpanzees and bonobos as legal persons).
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an injury in fact to bring suit in his own name. Consider, for example, a
proposed statutory ban on the importation of goods made with dog or cat
fur148a statutory ban that, if disregarded, might not be easily enforceable
by human beings, because it is not obvious how that ban would help any
particular plaintiff (though competitors would probably have standing here).
And even if statutes protecting animal welfare might be enforceable by human
beings, Congress might grant standing to animals in their own right, partly
to make a public statement about whose interests are most directly at stake,49
partly to increase the number of private monitors of illegality, and partly to
bypass complex inquiries into whether prospective human plaintiffs have
injuries in fact. Indeed, I believe that in some circumstances, Congress should
do exactly that, in order to provide a supplement to necessarily limited public
enforcement efforts.
Suppose that Congress does grant a cause of action to animals directly,
allowing them to prevent actions harmful to their interests, such as extinc-
tion or suffering. Is there anything problematic in this course of action? The
only serious question is constitutional in nature: whether the grant of standing
would violate Article III's requirement of a "case or controversy."'5 Nothing
in the text of the Constitution limits cases to actions brought by persons; but
perhaps it could be argued that Congress could not constitutionally confer
standing on animals. On this view, the modem understanding of what quali-
fies as a case or controversy should be based on an inquiry into what the found-
ing generation understood to count as such. 5' To say the least, the founding
generation believed that actions would be brought by human beings, and
did not anticipate that dogs or chimpanzees could bring suit in their own
name. Ideas of this kind have been used to limit the class of disputes that
Congress can place in an Article III court;152 perhaps they could be used to
forbid Congress from giving standing to animals.
The central problem with this objection is that Congress is frequently
permitted to create juridical persons and to allow them to bring suit in their
own right. Corporations are the most obvious example. But plaintiffs need
not be or be expressly labeled persons, juridical or otherwise, and legal rights
148. See Dog and Cat Protection Act of 2000, 106th Cong. § 4(a) (not introduced). The
impetus for the ban is that dogs and cats are often treated cruelly, and a ban would reduce the market
for the cruel treatment. See id. § 2(a)(7).
149. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2044-45 (1996).
150. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
151. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881,882 (1983).
152. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 566-67 (1992); see also Scalia,
supra note 151, at 892.
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are also given to trusts, municipalities, partnerships, and even ships.153 In an
era in which slaves were not considered persons or citizens, 5 ' it was entirely
acceptable to allow actions to be brought by slaves.155 The fact that slaves did
not count as persons was no barrier to the suit. In particular, slaves were
allowed to bring suit, often through a white guardian or "next friend," to
challenge unjust servitude."5 6 A similar understanding seems to underlie the
many cases in which animals or species are listed as named plaintiffs. I have
suggested that this is a misinterpretation of the relevant statutes,15 but it is
perfectly acceptable as an understanding of the Constitution. In the same
way, Congress might say that animals at risk of injury or mistreatment have
a right to bring suit in their own name. Indeed, it would be acceptable for
Congress to conclude that a work of art, a river, or a building should be
allowed to count as a plaintiff or a defendant, and authorize human beings
to represent them to protect their interests. So long as the named plaintiff
would suffer injury in fact, the action should be constitutionally acceptable.
The case or controversy requirement means that courts may not hear
cases in which there is no cause of action, and it imposes other limitations
on judicial power, including, under current doctrine, requirements of injury
and prohibitions on mootness, political questions, and merely ideological
claims. To be sure, the framers anticipated that plaintiffs would ordinarily
be human beings. But nothing in the Constitution limits Congress' power
to give standing to others. The conclusion is that if Congress wants to give
animals standing to bring suit to protect their legal interests, it is permitted
to do so.
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND SPECULATIONS
This is not the place for a general treatment of the law of standing or
the question of animal rights. But the discussion does bear on those issues,
and it will therefore be useful to offer a few brief speculations here.
A. Standing and the Problem of Injury in Fact
The area of standing to protect animals suggests (yet again) the extreme
awkwardness of continuing to proceed as if injury in fact is a necessary or
153. See Stone, supra note 6, at 452.
154. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
155. See ROBERT B. SHAW, A LEGAL HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 110-
53 (1991).
156. See id. at 110.
157. See supra note 146.
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sufficient condition for standing.' Many people have injuries in fact in
connection with the suffering of others, human or nonhuman, but they do
not have standing for that reason. If Jones sees an act of abuse directed against
a child, a friend, or a horse, he may well suffer injury. Indeed, he may well
be willing to pay a great deal to avoid that injury, and it defies credulity to
say that the injury is not personal. But he is not entitled to bring suit in
federal court by virtue of that injury. Some source of law must make that
injury legally cognizable. In the three sorts of cases I have discussed-
informational, competitive, and aesthetic injury-standing exists to the extent
that it makes sense to interpret the relevant source of law as giving particu-
lar persons a right to bring suit. The most important point to recognize is
that Congress has control over that question.
The second most important point to recognize is a corollary: When
standing cases seem hard, it is because it is not clear, from those statutes
that have been enacted, whether the plaintiff has been given a right to
bring suit. The information cases are easiest when Congress has spoken unam-
biguously on the question. Competitor standing is generally easy too, for the
Court has suggested that when a competitor is injured in fact, it should be
assumed that Congress sought to prevent that injury. The aesthetic injury
cases are quite difficult if it is unclear whether, in enacting the statutes pro-
tecting animal welfare, Congress should be taken to have granted a private
cause of action to people who are distressed by seeing mistreated animals. It
is for this reason that the two Animal Legal Defense Fund cases could have
gone the other way; the real dispute involved the best reading of the under-
lying statute. It is important to recognize these points partly because they
clarify a topic that is otherwise quite confusing, partly because they make it
possible to see what reasonable people might be disagreeing about, and
above all because they place control of the standing question in the hands
of the democratic process, which is where it belongs.
B. Disaggregating Animal Rights-and the Capacity to Suffer
What about the larger question of animal rights?'59 Many people reject
the idea that animals can have rights, often on the theory that rights belong
only to those with certain cognitive capacities, that is, to human beings."60
Some people think that it is important to say that animals lack rights even
158. Many people have raised this concern. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 130, at 223.
159. See, e.g., RACHELS, supra note 1.
160. See, e.g., WILLIAM BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS? (1974). WISE, supra note 19, at
175-233, argues that some nonhuman animals have the requisite cognitive capacities. I believe
that these capacities are not a prerequisite for rights, as explained below.
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if people have duties to animals. Without answering the largest questions
about the nature of rights, we might suggest that for certain purposes at least,
it is important to disaggregate the idea of rights into its various component
parts. Speaking pragmatically, the foundation for a legal right is an enforce-
able claim of one kind or another.'61 If rights are understood in this mun-
dane and pragmatic way, there is nothing novel or unfamiliar about the
notion of animal rights. Indeed, no one seriously urges that animals should
lack legally enforceable claims against egregious cruelty, and animals have
long had a wide range of rights against cruelty and mistreatment under state
law, rights that have recently been growing in both state and national leg-
islatures. The capacity to suffer is, in this sense, a sufficient basis for legal
rights for animals.
In fact, it would not be much of a stretch to discern, from the current
legal consensus, a kind of bill of rights for animals, one that now commands
broad agreement, at least in terms of legal texts. These rights include, at a
minimum, general protection against cruelty, broadly defined, and a general
right to adequate food and shelter. Under existing law, they do not include
protection against use as food, protection against cruelty on the farm, and
protection against use in connection with scientific experiments. Partial and
disputed protections include safeguards against cruelty in connection with
scientific experiments and protection against harms from lack of exercise or
lack of attention to psychological well-being.
For purposes of knowing to what extent animals have rights, it is not suf-
ficient to know whether animals are able to vindicate these rights in their own
name. Rights can include substantive safeguards without independent author-
ity to initiate litigation. Many of the most familiar legal rights are enforce-
able only by public authorities. We have seen that mere neglect of animal
welfare counts as a criminal violation, and people are under an affirmative
obligation to expend resources for the care and protection of animals. In
many states, a failure to feed or shelter an animal can amount to a violation
of that animal's rights. The AWA creates national rights to food, shelter,
medical care, and even adequate ventilation. Indeed, animals have, under
current law, a remarkable set of legal entitlements, including property rights
of various sorts, 62 and they enjoy these rights against their owners. The
reason that the relevant rights do not matter in the world-to the extent
that they do not-is that little enforcement activity is directed against
violations. The reasons for this are that the substantive right is protected
161. Of course those who lack rights, so understood, may deserve them, and those who deserve
rights, so understood, may lack them.
162. These are not rights to exclusive possession, of course.
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only by public enforcement, and public authorities have limited budgets and
limited commitments to the underlying rights. The real question, and the
question on which much future debate is inevitable, is the extent and
dimension of animal rights, not their substantive recognition as such. My
suggestion is that we should disaggregate the various ingredients of rights,
including substantive safeguards, the power to initiate proceedings for rights
violations, available defenses and excuses, and the level of resources devoted
to protection. Of course, there are complex philosophical issues about the
nature of moral (as opposed to legal) rights and the identity of proper rights
bearers. But these complexities need not get in the way of progress on the
issue of legal rights as such.
In an instructive discussion of the general problem, Gary Francione makes
a sharp distinction between animal welfare and animal rights. He contends
that American law is committed to preventing infliction of unnecessary pain
on animals and to ensuring that animals are treated humanely.'63 This commit-
ment results in a form of balancing in which animals, generally treated as mere
property, end up losing whenever human interests can be found on the other
side. "To label something property, is, for all intents and purposes, to con-
clude that the entity so labeled possesses no interests that merit protection
and that the entity is solely a means to the end determined by the property
owner."164 Francione seeks to replace "legal welfarism" with a system of ani-
mal rights, in which animals ultimately are regarded as having inherent worth
and value and are not treated as property at all.
Much of what Francione argues seems convincing. Often animals have
been regarded as means to human ends, and often the status of animals as
mere property has helped to ensure this unjust state of affairs. 65 Of course,
animals should not be treated as mere means to human ends, if only because
they are capable of suffering; complex thought, or the capacity to communi-
cate, should not be deemed a requirement for rights against unjustified suffer-
ing. In any case, both state and federal laws are firmly opposed to the notion
of animals as mere means. But there is nothing magical in the notions of
animal welfare and animal rights; what matters is not the abstractions but
the concrete meanings given to them. It is possible to imagine a regime of
animal rights in which the permissible justifications for intrusions are so numer-
ous, and so undemanding, that animals are hardly protected at all. (This now
appears to be true with respect to animals raised for food, a situation in which
protections against cruelty are extremely weak.) It is possible to imagine a
163. See FRANCIONE, supra 3, at 253.
164. Id.
165. See WISE, supra note 19, for a general discussion.
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regime of animal welfare in which the interest in avoiding pain and suffering
is taken extremely seriously, so much so that it overcomes many significant
human interests. (We could imagine protections against cruelty in connec-
tion with raising animals for food that would be so stringent, and so expen-
sive, as to reduce both the supply of animals to eat and the demand for eating
animals.) In fact, it is reasonable to think that all or most legal rights qual-
ify as such not for any mysterious reason, but because of their beneficial
effects on welfare, however understood; in this view, legal rights are instru-
mental to well-being, suitably defined.'" Francione seems wrong to contrast
welfare and rights so sharply.
What about the notion of animals as property? How important is this
notion? Here the stakes are a mixture of substance and rhetoric. If the
status of property means the status of mere means to the ends of others, or a
status of human domination and control, animals should not have the
status of property.'67 But even inanimate objects can be, and are, protected
against full domination and control; you may not bum down your house,
and if you have certain kinds of property, you are prevented from destroying
it. A regime could easily provide large protections against art, even if the
relevant art is privately owned; the right of property would be, to that
extent, qualified. Animals currently count as property, but according to the
law as it is on the books, they are nonetheless protected against a wide
range of injuries. We can imagine a situation in which animals are owned,
but in which the right of ownership does not include the right to inflict
suffering; indeed, that is very much the law as it now stands. The right of
ownership is significantly qualified by restrictions on what can be done with
that right. There is nothing unusual about this; rights of ownership are always
qualified in one way or another. I do not believe that it is necessary to con-
sider animals to be persons, or to insist on certain cognitive powers in order
to say that, by virtue of their capacity to suffer, they deserve legal rights
against cruelty, abuse, and neglect.
But the rhetoric does matter. In the long term, it would indeed make
sense to think of animals as something other than property, partly in order
to clarify their status as beings with rights of their own." It would not be a
166. This general view is defended in HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 11.
167. See WISE, supra note 19, for an argument in favor of "legal personhood" for animals.
168. Nothing I have said here deals with the question of how to resolve serious conflicts
between animal well-being and human well-being--conflicts that might arise when, for example,
laboratory experiments on animals are necessary to combat illnesses in human beings. I am suggesting
that a great deal could be done to reduce animal suffering--sometimes a product of cruelty, often a
product of simple negligence-without attempting to answer the hard questions involving serious
conflicts.
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huge leap from current norms to establish an understanding that people do
not own their dogs, cats, or horses, even if they have significant rights over
the liberty of nonhuman creatures who live with them.
Let me conclude, however, with a more modest suggestion. A serious
problem under the principal national protection against animal suffering-
the AWA-is that the Department of Agriculture lacks sufficient resources
to enforce it adequately. At a minimum, the act should be amended to cre-
ate a private cause of action by affected persons and animals so they may
bring suit against facilities that violate the act. A serious problem with cur-
rent animal welfare statutes, including the AWA, is an absence of sufficient
enforcement activity, a problem that stems in part from limited government
resources. At least when a violation of the statute is unambiguous, private
parties should be permitted to bring suit directly against violators. This sys-
tem of dual public and private enforcement would track the pattern under
many federal environmental statutes. There is no reason that it should not
be followed for statutes protecting animal welfare.
CONCLUSION
There is nothing new or unfamiliar in the idea of animal rights. In the
last thirty years, protection of animal rights-in the form of protection of
animal welfare-has become an unmistakable part of federal law. The
serious issues are those of definition (what kinds of rights do animals have?
what excuses and defenses are available to those who would otherwise be
rights violators?) and of enforcement (who is entitled to enforce existing
rights and duties? how much money is being devoted to enforcement?). To
answer these questions, it is necessary to disaggregate the idea of animal
rights into its component parts. I have suggested that the capacity to suffer
should be a sufficient condition for presumptive legal rights, thus disaggre-
gated, for animals.
My principal topic here has involved that aspect of enforcement that
comes under the rubric of standing. The conclusions for which I have argued
are best divided into two categories: (1) when Congress has power to confer
standing, through explicit statement, and (2) when standing exists under
current law. We have seen that Congress can give people standing to bring
suit to obtain information bearing on the treatment of animals. Congress
can also give people standing to bring suit to vindicate aesthetic interests in
ensuring the humane treatment of animals, so long as such people have an
actual plan to see the relevant animals. Congress can give people standing
to bring suit to prevent an increased likelihood that members of certain
species will decrease in number, so long as such people have an imminent,
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nonspeculative plan to see or study the relevant animals. Finally, Congress
has the authority to grant animals standing to protect their interests, in the
sense that injured animals might be counted as juridical persons, to be pro-
tected by human plaintiffs initiating proceedings on behalf of animals.
Under the APA as it now stands, a person has standing to obtain
information involving the well-being of animals, unless the statute gives
rise to a contrary inference or the plaintiff cannot distinguish his interest
from that of the public at large. Under the APA, a person has standing to pro-
tect animals that she likes to see or to study if the action at issue threatens
to diminish the population of the relevant species. The principal qualification
of this claim is that the law has a degree of uncertainty about when the rele-
vant injury will be attributed to the government's conduct.'69 Under the APA,
a person has standing to protect animals that she likes to see or study, if the
plaintiff has an imminent and not merely speculative plan to see or study
the relevant animals.
Under existing statutes, animals do not have standing as such to protect
their own interests. But Congress is entitled to grant them standing if it
chooses to do so. Building on these claims, I have suggested that Congress
should grant a private cause of action both to injured persons and to ani-
mals themselves, to prevent practices that are already unlawful. Legislative
decisions on such questions will have considerable symbolic importance.
But they will not be only symbolic, for they will help define the real-world
meaning of statutory texts that attempt to protect animal welfare-statutes
that now promise a great deal but deliver far too little.
169. Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) with Federal Election
Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 111 (1998).
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APPENDIX
Major Federal Statutes Protecting Animals
Humane Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 (1994).
Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (1994).
Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668-668d (1994).
Airborne Hunting Act, 16 U.S.C. § 742j-1 (1994).
Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994).
Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1994).
Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (1994).
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
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